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Abstract
In a Stackelberg network pricing game, a leader sets prices for a given subset of edges so
as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose a shortest path from their
source to sink. We study the counter-intuitive phenomenon that the use of negative prices by
the leader may in fact increase his profit. In doing so, we answer the following two questions.
First, how much more profit can the leader earn by setting negative prices? Second, for which
network topologies can the profit be increased by using negative prices? Our main result shows
that the profit with negative prices can be a factor Θ(log(m · k¯)) larger than the maximum profit
with positive prices, where m is the number of priceable edges in the graph and k¯ ≤ 2m the
number of followers. In particular, this factor cannot be bounded for the single follower case,
and can even grow linearly in m if the number of followers is large. Our second result shows
that series-parallel graphs with a single follower and Stackelberg games with matroid followers
are immune to the negative price paradox.
Keywords. Stackelberg games, pricing, negative prices, road tolling.
1 Introduction
Suppose that you are planning to buy an intercontinental flight. It is not uncommon to find that
a direct flight between two main hubs of a carrier is more expensive than taking an extra leg to
a smaller hub. So adding an extra flight to your itinerary, might in fact decrease your costs. One
way of explaining this behavior of flight carriers is the following. Suppose there are two classes of
customers: businessmen who are willing to pay a high price for the direct flight, and tourists who
are willing to pay a lower price, but need to travel longer to reach their destination. In order to
extract both types’ surplus, it is optimal to set a higher price for the direct flight and a lower price
for the longer connecting flight.
The lower price for a connecting flight is an example of bundle pricing: the price of two con-
necting flights is cheaper than buying both flights separately. In other words, firms are willing to
put a negative price on a good so as to sell multiple goods instead of only one. The example above
shows that this can be beneficial when having multiple customers, but a similar result applies when
having just a single customer. With a single customer however, the question whether bundle pricing
is better than single item pricing depends on the set of feasible bundles of the customer. Whenever
goods are either perfect complements or perfect substitutes, bundle pricing will not improve your
profit. The case where customers buy paths from an origin to a destination is of special interest,
as it is a simplified model of many transportation markets.
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We consider the class of Stackelberg network pricing games to model the above situation. These
models are typically used for road tolling problems and were first introduced by Labbe´ et al. [30].
In Stackelberg network pricing games, a leader moves first by setting prices on edges he owns,
after which each follower decides on a path of minimum cost between her source and sink. The
objective of the leader is to maximize profit. It is therefore a natural and common assumption in
the literature to assume that prices are non-negative, see, e.g., [5, 8, 9, 28, 38]. However, Labbe´
et al. [30] gave an example of a Stackelberg single-follower shortest-path pricing game in which
the profit is maximized by using negative prices. We call this phenomenon the negative price
paradox. The use of negative prices in that example can be thought of as a bundle pricing strategy
of the leader that guarantees that the follower uses multiple edges owned by the leader. The main
question we want to answer is how much more profit can the leader earn by using such bundle
pricing strategies. Since calculating optimal bundle prices is rather intractable as a price has to
be determined for each of the exponentially many bundles of resources, we restrict our analysis to
single item pricing. Thus, we model bundle pricing by allowing for negative prices of the leader.
For multiple followers, it might not be surprising that the profit can be arbitrarily larger with
negative prices compared to restricting to positive prices. However, our main result shows that
the same is true for a single follower. So even though the assumption of non-negative prices is
natural, it clearly has an impact on the maximum profit the leader can achieve. Our contribution
is two-fold. From a practical perspective, we show that a very simple bundle pricing mechanism,
using positive and negative single item prices, can achieve arbitrarily higher profits than single
item pricing with only positive prices. From a theoretical perspective, we show that a seemingly
innocent assumption, non-negative prices, might have a big impact on the outcome of the game.
1.1 Contribution
We start by studying Stackelberg network pricing games in which the followers choose a shortest
path from source to sink. Our main goal is to quantify the loss in profit due to assuming non-
negative prices. For this purpose, we define the Price of Positivity (PoP), which is the ratio
between the profit of the leader when he is allowed to use negative prices and when he is not.
Theorem 3.1 proves that the PoP can be of order Θ(logm · k¯), where m is the number of priceable
edges and k¯ ≤ 2m the number of followers. We prove that this bound is asymptotically tight by
means of two different classes of instances. First, Theorem 3.4 shows that the price of positivity
can be arbitrarily large even with a single follower. To prove this, we use the class of generalized
Braess graphs [36]. Second, Theorem 3.8 shows that the price of positivity can be arbitrarily large
in path graphs given that there are sufficiently many followers.
Then we turn to the question of which network topologies are immune to the negative price
paradox. A network is immune to the paradox if for all instances within that network the negative
price paradox cannot occur. Theorem 4.1 proves that in series-parallel graphs with a single follower,
the leader can extract all surplus from the follower by means of positive prices. We then show
that in fact, with a single follower, series-parallel graphs are exactly the class of networks that
are immune to the negative price paradox. Moreover, by a result of Labbe´ et al. [30], this also
implies that Stackelberg network pricing games in series-parallel graphs with a single follower are
polynomial-time solvable.
We then consider a generalization of Stackelberg network pricing games. We consider the setting
in which followers, instead of an s-t path, choose a basis of a given matroid, for instance, a spanning
tree in a graph. We prove that in this setting the negative price paradox cannot occur. Lastly,
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we consider clutters, i.e., set systems that only contain inclusion-wise minimal sets. We derive a
necessary and a closely related sufficient condition for clutters to admit the negative price paradox,
but a complete characterization remains open.
1.2 Related literature
Stackelberg competition was first introduced by Von Stackelberg [39] and is now commonly used to
describe leader-follower models. Stackelberg network pricing games gained attention due to Labbe´
et al. [30], who used the game to model road tolling problems. They showed that the problem of
finding the optimal prices for the leader when there is only one follower that chooses a shortest path
is NP-hard when prices have lower bounds. Roch et al. [35] proved the more general result that the
problem is also NP-hard when prices are unrestricted. Joret [28] showed that the problem is even
APX-hard and Briest et al. [8] gave a first approximation threshold, namely, the problem cannot
be approximated within a factor of 2− o(1). For a more detailed survey on this problem, see van
Hoesel [38]. Recently, also different combinatorial problems were studied in a Stackelberg setting.
For example, Cardinal et al. [12] proved that the Stackelberg single-follower minimum spanning
tree problem is APX-hard. Bilo` el al. [5] and later Cabello [11] studied Stackelberg shortest path
tree games.
Balcan et al. [3] and Briest et al. [9] considered single-price strategies. They both show inde-
pendently that this very simple pricing strategy provides a logarithmic approximation algorithm.
Bo¨hnlein et al. [10] extended the analysis of this simple algorithm beyond the combinatorial setting.
One more common application of pricing in road tolling problems is to restore inefficiency.
Beckmann et al. [6] and Dafermos and Sparrow [17] showed that marginal tolls induce efficient
flows when considering the model with congestion effects introduced by Wardrop [41]. Optimal
tolls also exist when users are heterogeneous with respect to the trade-off between time and money.
See, e.g., [15, 19, 29, 40]. Hearn and Ramana [25] and later Harks et al. [21] considered the
problem of characterizing the set of all optimal tolls and used this polyhedron to propose secondary
optimization problems. Recently, Basu et al. [4] improved some of the complexity results for one
of these problems called the minimum tollbooth problem.
Efficiency can also be obtained when tolls are imposed by selfish leaders, i.e., leaders that want
to maximize their profit as in Stackelberg pricing games. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] considered
parallel networks in which the leader owns all edges and followers have a fixed reservation value
for travel. Their main result is that the monopolist extracts all surplus from the followers and
induces the optimal flow. Huang et al. [26] showed that this result can be generalized to other
topologies. Recently, more attention has been addressed to the problem in which multiple leaders
compete for followers and thereby induce inefficient flows. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [2] introduced
the model with parallel networks and inelastic users. This was later generalized by Ozdagler [34]
and Hayrapetyan et al. [24] to elastic users, and by Johari et al. [27] to firms that have to make
entry and investment decisions. Correa et al. [16] and Harks et al. [22] considered the extension in
which a central authority sets price caps for the leaders so as to minimize inefficiencies.
A seemingly related paradox is Braess’s paradox [7]. It describes the phenomenon in which the
increase of resources, like building a new road in a network, may in fact lead to larger costs for the
users. Milchtaich [32] derived a characterization that shows that for undirected single-commodity
networks, series-parallel graphs are the largest class of graphs for which Braess’s paradox does
not occur. This result has been generalized by Chen et al. [14] and Cenciarelli et al. [13] to
directed graphs and multi-commodity instances. Roughgarden [36] investigated how to improve
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the performance of a network when it is allowed to remove edges. Fujishige et al. [20] characterized
the presence of Braess’s paradox for clutters. Namely, matroids are exactly those clutters for which
Braess’s paradox does not occur.
In the mechanism design literature, the performance of selling optimal bundles is also studied.
There, it is well-known that revenue maximization with more than one good is a difficult problem.
For some results on the performance of selling optimal bundles, see, e.g., Li and Yao [31], and Hart
and Nissan [23], and the references therein.
2 Model
A Stackelberg network pricing game is given by a tuple M = (G, (ce)e∈E , Ep,K, (s
k, tk, Rk)k∈K),
where G = (V,E) is a directed multigraph, ce ∈ R+ is the fixed cost of edge e ∈ E, Ep ⊆ E is the
set of priceable edges, K = {1, . . . , k¯} is the set of followers, (sk, tk) ∈ V × V is the source-sink pair
and Rk ∈ R+ is the reservation value for each k ∈ K. Let m = |Ep| and for each k ∈ K, let P
k
denote the set of sk, tk-paths.
A Stackelberg network pricing game contains two types of players: one leader, and one or more
followers. For each priceable edge e ∈ Ep, the leader can specify a price pe ∈ R. Let p = (pe)e∈Ep
denote a vector of prices. Given a vector of prices p, the total costs of a path P ∈ Pk for follower
k ∈ K are defined by
cP =
∑
e∈P
ce +
∑
e∈P∩Ep
pe.
For each p ∈ REp , each follower chooses a path P k(p) ∈ Pk with cP k(p) ≤ R
k so as to minimize
total costs, and if no such path exists, chooses P k(p) = ∅. Think of Rk as an unpriceable edge for
follower k ∈ K from source to sink with a fixed cost of Rk.
For each p ∈ REp, the profit of the leader is equal to
π(p) =
∑
k∈K
∑
e∈P k(p)∩Ep
pe.
We assume that the leader chooses p so as to maximize profit.
We make the following two assumptions. First, we assume that if there are ties in the lower
level, the follower chooses the most profitable path for the leader. This is to make sure that we do
not have to deal with arbitrarily small epsilons. Second, we assume that the graph is irredundant,
i.e., each edge is contained in at least one sk-tk path for some k ∈ K. Edges that are on no such
path are not relevant for our problem and can be deleted.
We call a price vector p ∈ REp optimal if for all p′ ∈ REp, π(p) ≥ π(p′). We denote an optimal
solution by p∗. We call a price vector p ∈ R
Ep
+ optimal for non-negative prices if for all p
′ ∈ R
Ep
+ ,
π(p) ≥ π(p′). We denote an optimal solution for non-negative prices by p∗+. For a given model M,
we define the price of positivity by
PoP (M) =
π(p∗)
π(p∗+)
.
Labbe´ et al. [30] already observed that an optimal solution for the leader may involve negative
prices. We study the question of how much profit a leader can loose by restricting prices to be
positive.
4
3 Optimal Profit
In the following section, we will prove our main result. We characterize the loss in profit due to
assuming that prices are non-negative.
Theorem 3.1. Let F(m, k¯) be the family of Stackelberg network pricing games with |Ep| = m and
|K| = k¯ ≤ 2m. Then supM∈F(m,k¯) PoP (M) = Θ
(
log(m · k¯)
)
.
As a warmup, we give an example that illustrates the phenomenon we want to study. A similar
example was first given by Labbe´ et al. [30].
Example 3.2. Consider a game with one follower that chooses a shortest path from s to t in the
network of Figure 1. The priceable edges are depicted as thicker arrows, and right above of each
edge is its cost or price. The reservation value is R = 3. Let P1, P2 and P3 denote the paths defined
by the sequences of nodes (s, u, v, t), (s, u, t) and (s, v, t), respectively.
s u v t
1
p1 p2
1
p3
Figure 1: A Braess graph
Suppose that p1, p2, p3 ≥ 0. If the leader wants to induce P1 as a shortest path for the follower,
then necessarily p1 + p2 ≤ 1 and p2 + p3 ≤ 1 and thus π(p) = p1 + p2 + p3 ≤ 2. If the leader wants
the follower to choose path P2, then p1 + 1 ≤ 3 and thus π(p) = p1 ≤ 2. Similarly for path P3.
Combining these three statements implies π(p∗+) = 2.
Now, suppose that p∗ = (p1, p2, p3) = (3,−3, 3), then P1 has a cost of 3, and P2 and P3 have a
cost of 4, and thus the follower will choose path P1. Hence π(p
∗) = 3 and PoP (M) = 3/2.
Negative prices can be seen as a simplified type of bundling scheme. Consider the following
situation that can be modeled by the same network. A company is selling high quality pasta and
high quality tomato sauce to buyers that want a high quality meal for $3 (a meal is of high quality
if the pasta or the sauce has high quality). A low quality pasta is being sold for $1 and a low quality
tomato sauce for $1. If the company sets a positive price for each individual product, the maximum
possible profit is $2. But it might as well give a discount of $1 if both high quality products are
bought together, getting the full profit of $3.
We now prove the main theorem. We separate it into three distinct theorems: one for the upper
bound, one for a lower bound with k¯ = 1 and another for a lower bound with k¯ = 2m − 1.
Let ℓkv(p) denote the cost of a shortest s− v path of follower k ∈ K for a given vector of prices
p ∈ R|Ep|.
Theorem 3.3. Let M∈ F(m, k¯) and Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i denote the n-th harmonic number. Then
PoP (M) ≤ Hmk¯.
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Proof. Let p∗ ∈ REp , p∗+ ∈ R
Ep
+ denote an optimal, optimal positive solution of the leader, respec-
tively. Notice that
π(p∗) ≤
∑
k∈K
Rk − ℓkt (0).
Briest et al. [9] proved that for all ǫ > 0 there exists an algorithm that in polynomial time calculates
a single-price strategy, i.e., one that sets the same price on all priceable edges, that yields a profit
of at least ∑
k∈K R
k − ℓkt (0)
(1 + ǫ) ·Hmk¯
and thus
π(p∗+) ≥
∑
k∈K R
k − ℓkt (0)
Hmk¯
.
Combining the above two statements yields
π(p∗)
π(p∗+)
≤ Hmk¯.
The next result shows that the price of positivity can be arbitrarily large, even if there is only
a single follower.
Theorem 3.4. For all n ∈ N, there exists a model M with m = 22n−1 − 1 and k¯ = 1 such that
PoP (M) = n.
Proof. Assume there is only one follower, i.e., k¯ = 1, that has reservation value R. For ease of
notation, we omit the superscripts that denote the followers. Consider the network of Figure 2,
where h ≥ 1. Besides s and t, there are h left nodes vℓ1, v
ℓ
2, . . . , v
ℓ
h and h right nodes v
r
1, v
r
2, . . . , v
r
h.
There is a fixed cost edge from s to each left vertex vℓi , with cost c
ℓ
i , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , h}. There
is a fixed cost edge from each right vertex vri to t, with cost c
r
i , for each i ∈ {1, . . . , h}. There is a
priceable edge from vℓi to v
r
i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , h} and a priceable edge from v
r
i to v
ℓ
i+1 for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , h− 1}. Denote their prices as pri and p
ℓ
i , respectively. Assume that c
ℓ
1 = c
r
h = 0, and
cℓi , c
r
i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , h}.
Note first that every path in the graph is completely defined by an edge leaving s and an edge
entering t. For 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ h, we define Pij as the path starting with edge (s, v
ℓ
i ) and ending with
edge (vrj , t). Let π
∗
+(Pij) denote the maximum profit when we impose that path Pij is shortest path
and the prices are all non-negative. Observe that the leader can always delete a priceable edge by
setting its price to be +∞. Notice that path Pij might never be a shortest path, so then we define
π∗+(Pij) = 0. In order to bound the optimal profit with positive prices, we need the following two
lemmas. We bound π∗+(Pij) first for the case i = j and then for the case i < j.
Lemma 3.5. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ h. If cℓi + c
r
i > R, then π
∗
+(Pii) = 0. If c
ℓ
i + c
r
i ≤ R, then
π∗+(Pii) ≤ R− c
ℓ
i − c
r
i .
Proof. The fixed cost of path Pii equals c
ℓ
i+c
r
i . If c
ℓ
i+c
r
i > R, then Pii is never a shortest path when
prices are non-negative and thus π∗+(Pii) = 0. Otherwise, the cost of Pii for the follower is p
r
i+c
ℓ
i+c
r
i ,
so if it is less than the reservation value R, we must have that π∗+(Pii) = p
r
i ≤ R− c
ℓ
i − c
r
i .
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s t
...
...
cℓ1
cℓh/2
cℓh/2+1
cℓh
pr1
cr1prh/2
crh/2
pℓh/2
prh/2+1
crh/2+1
prh
crh
Figure 2: The h-th Braess graph.
Lemma 3.6. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ j′ < i′ ≤ j ≤ h. If cℓi > c
ℓ
i′, then π
∗
+(Pij) = 0. If c
r
j > c
r
j′, then
π∗+(Pij) = 0. If c
ℓ
i ≤ c
ℓ
i′ and c
r
j ≤ c
r
j′ , then
π∗+(Pij) ≤ c
ℓ
i′ − c
ℓ
i + c
r
j′ − c
r
j .
Proof. If cℓi > c
ℓ
i′ , then Pi′j is always cheaper for the follower than Pij and thus Pij is never a
shortest path. If crj > c
r
j′ , then Pij′ is always cheaper than Pij and thus Pij is never a shortest path.
If cℓi ≤ c
ℓ
i′ and c
r
j ≤ c
r
j′ , then we have to make sure that the total cost of Pij for the follower is
at most the cost of Pi′j and Pij′ . Then we need to ensure that it is cheaper to reach v
ℓ
i′ following
Pij that taking directly the edge (s, v
ℓ
i′), and that it is cheaper to go from v
r
j′ to t following
Pij than taking directly the edge (v
r
j′ , t). This means that c
ℓ
i +
∑i′−1
m=i p
r
m +
∑i′−1
m=i p
ℓ
m ≤ c
ℓ
i′ and
crj+
∑j
m=j′+1 p
r
m+
∑j−1
m=j′ p
ℓ
m ≤ c
r
j′ , and thus π
∗
+(Pij) =
∑j
m=i p
r
m+
∑j−1
m=i p
ℓ
m ≤ c
ℓ
i′−c
ℓ
i+c
r
j′−c
r
j .
Let n ∈ N, with n ≥ 2, and h = 4n−1. We define fixed costs for the h-th Braess graph such
that the maximum profit using non-negative prices is at most 2 while the maximum profit when
allowing negative prices is 2n. Let R = 2n. We will set costs that satisfy
cℓi = 2n− 2− c
r
i = c
r
h/2+1−i = 2n − 2− c
ℓ
h/2+1−i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h/2. (1)
Thus, we only need to specify cℓh/2+i for 1 ≤ i ≤ h/2. We start by letting c
ℓ
h/2+1 = 1. We define
2n − 3 sets of edges recursively, where each set i = 1, . . . , 2n − 3 consists of 2i−1 edges. For each
i = 1, . . . , 2n − 3, define the fixed costs of the next 2i−1 edges as the fixed costs of all previously
defined 2i−1 edges plus 1. More precisely, for each i = 1, . . . , 2n−3, we take cℓh/2+2i−1+j = c
ℓ
h/2+j+1
for all j = 1, . . . , 2i−1. In other words, we define the following sequence:
(1); (2); (2, 3); (2, 3, 3, 4); (2, 3, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4, 5); . . . ; (2, 3, . . . , 2n− 2).
Now, we will prove that given these fixed costs, π∗+(Pij) ≤ 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ h. Firstly, by
condition (1), cℓi + c
r
i = 2n− 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ h, and thus by Lemma 3.5, π
∗
+(Pii) ≤ 2.
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Secondly, for each path Pij with i ≤ h/2 and j ≥ h/2 + 1, Lemma 3.6 with i
′ = h/2 + 1 and
j′ = h/2 implies π∗+(Pij) ≤ 2 − c
ℓ
i − c
r
j ≤ 2. Then by symmetry of the constructed graph, we can
restrict ourselves to paths Pij with i ≥ h/2 + 1.
Thirdly, consider a path Pij with i ≥ h/2 + 1 and suppose that
h
2
+ 1 ≤ i ≤
h
2
+ 2i
′′−1 and
h
2
+ 2i
′′−1 + 1 ≤ j ≤
h
2
+ 2i
′′
for some 1 ≤ i′′ ≤ 2n− 3. (2)
Necessarily cℓi ≥ 1 and c
r
j = 2n − 2 − c
ℓ
j ≥ 2n − 2 − (i
′′ + 1) from the definition of the costs.
If we take i′ = h/2 + 2i
′′−1 + 1 and j′ = h/2 + 2i
′′−1, then cℓi′ = 2 and c
r
j′ = 2n − 2 − i
′′. So
Lemma 3.6 implies that π∗+(Pij) ≤ c
ℓ
i′ − c
ℓ
i + c
r
j′ − c
r
j ≤ 2. If condition (2) does not hold, then
h/2 + 2i
′′−1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ h/2 + 2i
′′
, for some 1 ≤ i′′ ≤ 2n − 3. Therefore, by lemma 3.6, for any
i ≤ j′ < i′ ≤ j, we have that π∗+(Pij) ≤ c
ℓ
i′ − c
ℓ
i + c
r
j′ − c
r
j . But from the definition of the costs,
cℓi′ − c
ℓ
i + c
r
j′ − c
r
j = c
ℓ
i′−2i′′−1
− cℓ
i−2i′′−1
+ cr
j′−2i′′−1
− cr
j−2i′′−1
. So any bound that we can derive by
applying Lemma 3.6 for Pi−2i′′−1,j−2i′′−1 , also holds for Pij . If i < j we can iterate this procedure
until condition (2) holds, so we conclude that π∗+(Pij) ≤ 2.
Combining the above three steps yields π∗+(Pij) ≤ 2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ h. Notice that with the
prices pri = R for i = 1, . . . , h and p
ℓ
i = −R for i = 1, . . . , h− 1, every s, t-path costs at least R and
path P0h yields a profit of R. Thus, PoP (M) =
2n
2 = n for each n ∈ N.
Remark 3.7. The proof of Theorem 3.4 can also be used to prove the following statement. For
each n ∈ N , there exists a model M, with an optimal price vector p∗ and an optimal positive prices
vector p∗+ such that the cost for the follower is n times smaller under p
∗
+ than under p
∗.
The last result of this section models the flight carrier situation discussed in the introduction.
It proves that the price of positivity can be arbitrarily large for series-parallel networks, as long as
there are sufficiently many followers.
Theorem 3.8. For all m ∈ N, there exists a modelM consisting of a path graph G with m priceable
edges and k¯ = 2m − 1 followers such that
PoP (M) = m/2.
Proof. Consider the network of Figure 3, where m ≥ 1. Let ci = 2
m−i+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m. There
are m groups of followers. For i = 1, . . . ,m group i has 2i−1 distinct followers, all with source-sink
pair (s, ti) and reservation value ci.
s t1 t2 . . . tn
p1
c1
c2
cn
p2 pn
Figure 3: The m-th path graph.
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In order to bound the optimal profit with positive prices, we claim that if a follower from
group i travels, then all followers j = 1, . . . , i travel. This follows from the fact that (ci)
n
i=1 is
a decreasing sequence. So in order to maximize profit, the leader can restrict himself to choos-
ing p1 ∈ {c1, . . . , cm} and pi = 0 for all i = 2, . . . ,m. Thus, taking p1 = ci gives a profit of
2m−i+1
∑i
j=1 2
i−1 ≤ 2 · 2m.
The price vector p∗i = ci − ci−1, where c0 = 0, for all i = 1, . . . ,m yields a profit of
∑m
i=1 2
m =
m · 2m. Hence PoP (M) ≥ m/2.
4 Immune Structures to the Negative Price Paradox
We divide the following section into three subsections. The first subsection considers a single
shortest path follower. We characterize the class of topologies that are immune to the negative
price paradox. The second subsection considers a different variant of the model in which followers
choose the basis of a matroid. We prove that all these models are immune to the negative price
paradox. The third and last subsection considers a generalization of the model that includes both
of the variants studied. We try to characterize the class of clutters that are immune to the negative
price paradox.
4.1 Shortest path follower
Assume k¯ = 1. Let Gst denote a graph G = (V,E) with a fixed source-sink pair (s, t). We say that
a graph Gst is immune to the negative price paradox if for all models M = (Gst, (ce)e∈E , Ep, R),
PoP (M) = 1. A directed s-t graph is series-parallel if it either consists of a single edge (s, t), or
is obtained from two series-parallel graphs with terminal (s1, t1) and (s2, t2) composed either in
series or in parallel. In a series composition, t1 is identified with s2, s1 becomes s and t2 becomes
t. In a parallel composition, s1 is identified with s2 and becomes s, and t1 is identified with t2 and
becomes t.
The main result in this section shows that the leader can extract all surplus from the follower
in series-parallel graphs. This result has two interesting consequences. First, it implies that series-
parallel graphs are exactly those graphs that are immune to the negative price paradox. Second,
it implies that Stackelberg network pricing with a single follower are polynomial-time solvable in
series-parallel graphs, as Labbe´ et al. [30] shows that once the induced path of the follower is
known, the problem is polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 4.1. Let k¯ = 1. If G is series-parallel, then π(p∗+) = min{ℓt(+∞)− ℓt(0), R − ℓt(0)}.
Proof. We use what is called an open ear decomposition of the graph. An open ear is a directed
(simple) path. An open ear decomposition of G is a partition of E into open ears {E1, . . . , Eh¯}
such that the two endpoints of each open ear Ei, with i ≥ 2, belong to some previous open ears Ej
and Ej′ , with j < i and j
′ < i, and each internal vertex of each open ear Ei does not belong to Ej
for all j < i. Given an open ear decomposition {E1, . . . , Eh¯}, we say that Ei is nested in Ej if i > j
and the endpoints of Ei both appear in Ej . For such i and j, let the nest interval of Ei and Ej be
the path in Ej between the two endpoints of Ei. An open ear decomposition {E1, . . . , Eh¯} is nested
if for each i ≥ 2, Ei is nested in some Ej , and if Ei and Ei′ are both nested in Ej , then either the
nest interval of Ei contains that of Ei′ , or vice versa, or the two nest intervals are disjoint. An open
ear decomposition can be found starting with an arbitrary s-t path and greedily adding open ears.
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Eppstein [18] showed that the decompositions found this way are always nested in series-parallel
graphs. Now starting with the optimal path P (0), we describe a procedure to construct a specific
ear decomposition {P (0), E2, . . . , Eh¯}, which, since G is series-parallel, must be nested.
s t
pe2
E2
E3
pe3
Figure 4: A series-parallel graph is immune to the negative price paradox.
In this proof, we consider the graph G′, which is defined as G with an unpriceable edge from
s to t with a fixed cost of R. Notice that the problems in G and G′ are esssentially equivalent.
In particular, G′ is series-parallel, ℓ′t(+∞) = min{ℓt(+∞), R}, and π(p
∗
+) in G
′ equals π(p∗+) in G.
Let P (0) be a shortest s-t path in G′ when the prices are all set to 0. Denote by p′ the vector of
non-negative prices that yields the maximum profit under the restriction that P (p′) = P (0).
Assume that π(p′) < ℓ′t(+∞) − ℓt(0). We prove that there exists a path Pˆ ⊆ E
′ \ Ep with
cost strictly less than ℓ′t(+∞), which contradicts the definition of ℓ
′
t(+∞). Firstly, create the
vector p′′ starting with p′ and setting the price of all priceable edges outside P (0) to +∞. Clearly
π(p′′) = π(p′). Take any e2 ∈ P (0) ∩ Ep. Note that there must be an open ear E2 (a detour for
e2) such that the fixed costs of E2 are equal the total costs of the nest interval Eˆ2 ⊆ P (0). If such
an open ear would not exist, the leader could marginally increase the price p′′e2 without changing
the shortest path of the follower, yielding a strictly higher profit. Now take e3 ∈ P (0) ∩ Ep \ Eˆ2.
Analogously, there must be an open ear E3 with nesting interval Eˆ3 ⊆ P (0) such that the total cost
of E3 is equal to the total cost of Eˆ3. Inductively, define eh ∈ P (0)∩Ep \
⋃h−1
i=1 Eˆi, an open ear Eh
that is a detour for eh, and its nesting interval Eˆh ⊆ P (0) such that the cost of Eh is equal to the
cost of Eˆh, until P (0) ∩ Ep \
⋃h−1
i=1 Eˆi = ∅. Since G
′ is series-parallel, the open ear decomposition
must be nested, so using ears with disjoint nesting intervals we can define an s-t path Pˆ with the
same cost as P (0) under p′′ that uses only fixed cost edges. We conclude noting that the cost of
P (0) under p′′ is π(p′) + ℓ′t(0) < ℓ
′
t(+∞).
Corollary 4.2. Let k¯ = 1. A graph Gst is immune to the negative price paradox if and only if Gst
is a series-parallel graph.
Proof. First, assume that G is a series-parallel graph. Recall that π(p∗) ≤ R − ℓt(0) and π(p
∗) ≤
ℓt(+∞)− ℓt(0), and thus the result follows from Theorem 4.1.
Second, assume that Gst is not a series-parallel graph. We show that there is a model M =
(Gst, (ce)e∈E , Ep, R) such that PoP (M) > 1. Basically, if the graph is not series parallel one can
find a subgraph with the same structure as Example 3.2.
We call a subgraph G′ of G an s-t paradox if G′ = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 is the union of three paths
P1, P2, P3 with the following properties:
(i) P1 is an s-t path going through distinct vertices a, u, v, b such that s P1 a ≺P1 u ≺P1 v ≺P1
b P1 t, where (≺P1) denotes the order in which P1 visits the nodes.
(ii) P2 is an a− v path with V (P2) ∩ V (P1) = {a, v}.
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(iii) P3 is a u− b path with V (P3) ∩ V (P1) = {u, b} and V (P3) ∩ V (P2) = ∅.
Chen et al. [14] prove that if Gst is not series-parallel, then Gst contains an s-t paradox. Let
G′st = (V
′, E′) = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 be an s-t paradox contained in Gst. Let e1, e2 be the two outgoing
edges from a with e1 ∈ P2 and e2 ∈ P1, let e3 be an outgoing edge from u with e3 ∈ P1, and let
e4, e5 be the two incoming edges to b with e4 ∈ P1 and e5 ∈ P3. Define M as follows: ce = 1 if
e ∈ {e1, e5}, ce = 0 if e ∈ E
′ \ {e1, e5} and ce = +∞ if e ∈ E \E
′, Ep = {e2, e3, e4}, and R = 3. See
Figure 5 for an illustration.
s a u v b t
e1
e2 e3
e5
e4
Figure 5: An s-t paradox.
Suppose that p ∈ R
Ep
+ , then P (p) is either P1, P2 or P3. However, in all three cases, π(p) ≤ 2.
Now, suppose that p∗ = (3,−3, 3), then π(p∗) = 3. Hence PoP (M) = 32 > 1.
Corollary 4.3. Stackelberg network pricing games in series-parallel graphs with a single follower
are polynomial-time solvable.
We would like to stress that Theorem 4.1 is only valid for a single follower as the following
example shows.
Example 4.4. Consider the network of Figure 6. Each follower k = 1, 2 is defined by (sk, t), and
R1 = 2 and R2 = 1.
s1 s2 t
0
2
p
1
Figure 6: A series-parallel graph.
Clearly, it is impossible for the leader the extract 2 from follower 1 and 1 from follower 2.
Our last result of this subsection shows that the leader can extract all surplus from the follower
by using negative prices if the shortest path with respect to fixed price edges is owned by the leader.
In particular, these problems are polynomial solvable.
Lemma 4.5. Let k¯ = 1 and P (0) denote a shortest s-t path when the prices are all set to 0. If
P (0) ⊆ Ep, then π(p
∗) = min{ℓt(+∞)− ℓt(0), R − ℓt(0)}.
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Proof. We will show that the leader can extract all surplus from the follower. Notice that we can
assume that pe = +∞ for all e ∈ EP \ P (0). The profit maximization problem of the leader is
max
(pe)e∈Ep ,(ℓv(p))v∈V
∑
e∈P (0) pe
ℓv(p)− ℓu(p)− pe = ce ∀e = (u, v) ∈ P (0)
ℓv(p)− ℓu(p) ≤ ce ∀e = (u, v) ∈ E \ Ep
pe = +∞ ∀e ∈ Ep \ P (0)
ℓt(p) ≤ R.
The constraints guarantee that P (0) is a shortest path given price vector p.
Define δ−(v) = {(u, v) ∈ E for some u ∈ V } and δ+(v) = {(v,w) ∈ E for some w ∈ V }. The
dual of the above linear program is
min
(ye)e∈E ,y(s,t)
∑
e∈E ye · ce + y(s,t) · R
∑
e∈δ−(v) ye −
∑
e∈δ+(v) ye = 0 ∀v ∈ V \ {t}∑
e∈δ−(t) ye + y(s,t) −
∑
e∈δ+(t) ye = 0
ye = −1 ∀e ∈ P (0)
ye ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E \ Ep
ye = 0 ∀e ∈ Ep \ P (0)
y(s,t) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
min
(ye)e∈E\Ep ,y(s,t)
∑
e∈E\Ep
ye · ce + y(s,t) · R−
∑
e∈P (0) ce
∑
e∈δ−(v)∩(E\Ep)
ye −
∑
e∈δ+(v)∩(E\Ep)
ye = 0 ∀v ∈ V \ {s, t}∑
e∈δ−(s)∩(E\Ep)
ye −
∑
e∈δ+(s)∩(E\Ep)
ye = −1∑
e∈δ−(t)∩(E\Ep)
ye + y(s,t) −
∑
e∈δ+(t)∩(E\Ep)
ye = 1
ye ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E \ Ep
y(s,t) ≥ 0.
The optimal solution of the second dual either picks a shortest path in the graph with edge set
E \Ep, or sets ye = 0 for all e ∈ E and y(s,t) = 1. The result then follows by strong duality.
The result in Lemma 4.5 only applies to a single follower.
Example 4.6. Consider the network in Figure 7, where K = {1, 2, 3}. Let R1 = 1 and R2 = R3 =
2. Observe that the leader owns a shortest path from source to sink whenever pe = 0 for all e ∈ E
for each follower k ∈ K.
The total surplus of all followers equals
∑
k∈K R
k−ℓkt (0) = 1+2+2 = 5. However, the following
set is empty and thus the leader cannot extract all surplus:
{(p1, p2, p3) ∈ R
3 | p1 + p2 = 1, p2 + p3 = 2, p1 + p3 = 2, p3 ≤ 1}.
4.2 Matroid followers
A more general of description of the model we have been looking at is the following. A Stackelberg
pricing game is a tupleM =
(
E, (ce)e∈E, Ep,K, (S
k)k∈K , (R
k)k∈K
)
, where E is the set of resources,
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s3, t1 s2, t3
s1, t2
p1
p2
p3
1 2
2
1
Figure 7: A triangle network.
ce ∈ R is a fixed cost for each e ∈ E, Ep ⊆ E is the set of priceable resources, K = {1, . . . , k¯} is
the set of followers, Sk ⊆ 2E is the set of strategies and Rk ∈ R+ is the reservation value for each
k ∈ K.
So far we have studied the case where E is the set of edges in a network and Sk is the set of
sk-tk paths for each k ∈ K. Now, we assume that for each k ∈ K and all S, S′ ∈ Sk with S 6= S′,
S 6⊂ S′. That is, we assume that set system (E,Sk) is a clutter for each k ∈ K.
Given a vector of prices p ∈ REp , the total costs of a set S ∈ Sk for follower k ∈ K are defined
by
cS =
∑
e∈S
ce +
∑
e∈S∩Ep
pe.
For each p, each follower chooses a set Sk(p) ∈ Sk with csk(p) ≤ R
k so as to minimize total costs,
and if no such set exists, chooses Sk(p) = ∅. The reservation value Rk for follower k ∈ K can be
thought of as a feasible unpriceable resource with fixed cost Rk.
A matroid is a tuple M = (E,I), where E is a finite set, called the ground set, and I ⊆ 2E
is a non-empty family of subsets of E, called independent sets, such that: (1) ∅ ∈ I, (2) if X ∈ I
and Y ⊆ X, then Y ∈ I, and (3) if X,Y ∈ I with |X| > |Y |, then there exists an e ∈ X \ Y such
that Y ∪ {e} ∈ I (this property is called the augmentation property). The inclusion-wise maximal
independent sets of I are called bases of matroid M . See [33, 37, 42] for more information on
matroids.
We now consider the case in which instead of a path, each follower k chooses a minimum cost
basis of a given matroid Mk = (E,Ik), which is a generalization of the setting in which followers
choose spanning trees of a given graph [12]. We prove that in this case there is no need for negative
prices.
Theorem 4.7. Let M be a Stackelberg game where Sk is the base set of a matroid Mk for each
follower k ∈ K. Then PoP (M) = 1.
We first prove a lemma and then proceed to prove Theorem 4.7. These proofs strongly rely on
the fact that matroids are exactly those structures for which the greedy algorithm finds the optimal
solution. Greedy algorithms are very simple algorithms in which in each step a local optimal choice
is selected. This means that we can assume that for finding a minimum cost base, each follower
considers sequentially the next cheapest resource. If adding this resource to the set is feasible, then
the resource is selected. If not, the resource is not selected.
Lemma 4.8. Let M = (E,I) be a matroid with weights w : E → R, and A a minimum weight
base. If w′ is obtained by increasing the weight of an element e ∈ E, and if A is not optimal under
w′, then there is an element f ∈ E such that A− e+ f is an optimal base under w′.
Proof. Assume A is not optimal under w′, and that we run in parallel the greedy algorithm on
both instances. Call G1 the greedy algorithm running with weights w and G2 the greedy algorithm
running with weight w′. When looking at the ordered lists, it is clear that both lists are equal
up to element e. So the partial solutions up to element e are the same. Now, when G1 finds e,
it adds it to the solution, but G2 sees the next element. Since A is not optimal for w′, G2 must
find an element f /∈ A and add it to the partial solution before it reaches e in the list induced
by w′. Besides e and f , the two algorithms have added the same resources so far. Therefore,
the two partial solutions have the same size, and then, when one of the two algorithms can add
a new item, the other can as well, because of the augmentation property, whereas if a new item
cannot be added for one algorithm, it also cannot be added for the other algorithm, again by the
augmentation property. With this observation we can conclude that, at the end, the only difference
between the two solutions is elements e and f .
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Assume by contradiction that in p∗, the optimal solution of the leader, there
is a negative price p∗e < 0 for some resource e ∈ Ep. For each k ∈ K, let S
k(p∗) be the optimal
strategy for agent k, given p∗, obtained using the greedy algorithm. Let now p′ be equal to p∗ in
every resource but e, in which p′e = 0.
If Sk(p∗) is not optimal under p′, by Lemma 4.8 there is an element f ∈ E such that Sk(p
∗)−e+f
is optimal for the follower k. If f ∈ Ef , then the profit for the leader increases because he was loosing
value in e, and if f ∈ Ep, the optimality of Sk(p
∗) implies that p∗e < p
∗
f and then the leader also
increases his profit. We conclude that there is a positive solution p∗+ such that π(p
∗) ≤ π(p∗+).
4.3 Clutters
Assume that k¯ = 1. We say that (E,S) admits the negative price paradox if there is a modelM =
(E, (ce)e∈E, Ep,S, R) such that PoP (M) > 1. We say that (E,S) is immune to the negative price
paradox if there is no model M = (E, (ce)e∈E, Ep,S, R) that admits the negative price paradox.
We try to determine the structural properties of clutters that are immune to the paradox, as we
did for the network pricing games. Although we are not able to give a complete characterization,
we show a necessary condition and a closely related sufficient condition.
Proposition 4.9. If (E,S) admits the negative price paradox, then there are a, b, c ∈ E and
A,B,C ∈ S such that a ∈ A \ (B ∪ C), b ∈ (A ∩B) \ C, and c ∈ (A ∩ C) \B.
Proof. Assume (E,S) admits the negative price paradox. Let M = (E, (ce)e∈E , Ep,S, R) be a
model such that PoP (M) > 1. Let p∗ be the optimal solution for the leader, and let A be the
optimal strategy for the follower, given p∗. There must be a priceable resource a ∈ A such that
p∗a < 0, since PoP (M) > 1. Clearly, there must also be a priceable resource b ∈ A with p
∗
b > 0,
because otherwise the profit would be negative.
Suppose now that the leader increases pa by a small value ε > 0 and decreases pb by the same
ε. This will preserve the total cost of A and then this cannot be done for with every resource with
negative tolling unless PoP (M) = 1. So we can assume that we have a, b for which this cannot be
done for any ε > 0 without losing the optimality of A. Then, there is a strategy B ∈ S such that
a /∈ B, b ∈ B and with cost equal to the cost of A.
14
Now, there must be a third priceable resource c ∈ A \ B as well, such that pc > 0. If not,
setting pa = 0 would increase the profit of the leader by selling B, contradicting the optimality for
the leader. By the same argument as before, there is a strategy C with a /∈ C, c ∈ C and with cost
equal to the cost of A and B. Furthermore, we can assume that b /∈ C, because otherwise we could
repeat the argument for a resource d ∈ A \ C.
Proposition 4.10. If there are a, b, c ∈ E and A,B,C ∈ S such that a ∈ A\(B∪C), b ∈ (A∩B)\C,
and c ∈ (A ∩C) \B, and there are no S ∈ S with S ⊆ A ∪B ∪C, then (E,S) admits the negative
price paradox.
Proof. Assume there are a, b, c ∈ E and A,B,C ∈ S such that a ∈ A \ (B ∪ C), b ∈ (A ∩ B) \ C,
and c ∈ (A ∩ C) \ B, and there are no S ∈ S with S ⊆ A ∪ B ∪ C. We define a model M =
(E, (ce)e∈E, Ep,S, R) such that PoP (M) > 1.
Assume that Ep = {a, b, c} and ce = 0 for all e ∈ Ep. Since S is a clutter, there exists a
d ∈ B \A and d′ ∈ C \A with d not necessarily different from d′. If (B ∩C) \A 6= ∅, assume cd = 1
for some d ∈ B ∩C, and ce = 0 for all e ∈ (A∪B ∪C) \ {d}. If (B ∩C) \A = ∅, assume cd = 1 for
some d ∈ B \ A, cd′ = 1 for some d
′ ∈ C \ A, and ce = 0 for all e ∈ (A ∪ B ∪ C) \ {d, d
′}. For all
f ∈ E \ (A ∪B ∪ C), assume cf = +∞. Moreover, assume that R = 3.
First, we consider the maximum profit by assuming that prices are non-negative. The only way
the leader can make a profit of 3 is by selling set A. All other sets have a fixed cost of at least 1.
If the leader wants to sell A, the costs of sets B and C must be at least 3 and thus, pb ≥ 2 and
pc ≥ 2. However, this implies that the costs of A are at least 4 and thus the follower does not buy
any set.
Second, we consider the maximum profit by allowing for negative prices. Setting pa = −1 and
pb = pc = 2 yields a profit of 3 by selling set A. Notice that sets B and C have a cost of 3, and all
other sets a cost of at least 3. Hence PoP (M) > 1.
5 Discussion
We have shown the impact of negative prices on the profit of the leader in Stackelberg network
pricing games. The use of negative prices explains, for example, why flight carriers are willing to
give discounts on connecting flights. Our main result shows that the loss in profit due to assuming
positive prices can be arbitrarily large, even for a single follower. Moreover, we showed that series-
parallel graphs with a single follower are exactly those graphs that are immune to this phenomenon.
Several natural questions remain open. One important open question is whether the lower
bound on the price of positivity obtained in Theorem 3.8 is assymptotically tight in the number
of priceable edges. From Briest et al. [9], we know that a quadratic upper bound applies, whereas
the lower bound only grows linearly. A second open question is whether the necessary condition in
Proposition 4.9 is also a sufficient condition. We expect that there exists a simple characterization
of all structures that are immune to the negative price paradox, when having a single follower.
A potential generalization for our model is to allow for congestion externalities. A common
model for this setting is a non-atomic congestion game with the Wardrop equilibrium [41] as a
solution concept. This would also open up research towards models with multiple leaders. The
last example shows that when having congestion externalities, the price of positivity can already
be larger than one in series-parallel graphs. One immediate question motivated by the examples
15
we have found is how the price of positivity is related to the size of the network when there are
congestion externalities.
Example 5.1. Consider the network of Figure 8 and assume k¯ = 1 with (s1, t1, d1) = (s, t, 1). For
each p ∈ R2+, assume that the follows choose a Wardrop flow [41] with respect to ce(x) + pe.
s t
1/2 p1
x
1
p2
Figure 8: A single-commodity series-parallel graph.
Then the price vector p∗ = (−1/4, 3/4) yields a profit of 9/16, whereas p∗+ = (0, 1/2) yields a
profit of 1/2.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the participants of the AGCO-seminar, Jose´ Correa, Britta Peis and Oliver
Schaudt for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Millennium Nucleus
Information and Coordination in Networks, ICM/FIC RC130003, by the Millennium Institute for
Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP, IS130002, and by the Chilean Science
Council under CONICYT-PFCHA/Doctorado Nacional/2018-21180347.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A.: Flow control, routing, and performance from service provider
viewpoint. LIDS report 74 (2004)
[2] Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A.: Competition and efficiency in congested markets. Mathematics
of Operations Research 32 (1), 1–31 (2007)
[3] Balcan, M., Blum, A., Mansour, Y.: Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization. Proceedings of
the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 50–59 (2008)
[4] Basu, S., Lianeas, T., Nikolova, E.: New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum
Tollbooth Problem. Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics, 89–103 (2015)
[5] Bilo`, D., Guala`, L., Proietti, G., Widmayer, P.: Computational aspects of a 2-player Stackel-
berg shortest paths tree game. Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and
Network Economic, 251–262 (2008)
[6] Beckmann, M., McGuire, C., Winsten,C.: Studies in the Economics of Transportation (1956)
16
[7] Braess, D.: U¨ber ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschung 12 (1),
258–268 (1968)
[8] Briest, P., Chalermsook, P., Khanna, S., Laekhanukit, B., Nanongkai, D.: Improved hardness
of approximation for Stackelberg shortest-path pricing. Proceedings of the 6th International
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 444–454 (2010)
[9] Briest, P., Hoefer, M., Krysta, P.: Stackelberg Network Pricing Games. Algorithmica 62 (3-4),
733–753 (2012)
[10] Bo¨hnlein, T., Kratsch, S., Schaudt, O.: Revenue maximization in Stackelberg Pricing Games:
Beyond the combinatorial setting. Proceedings of the 44th International Colloquium on Au-
tomata, Languages, and Programming, 46:1–46:13 (2017)
[11] Cabello, S.: Stackelberg Shortest Path Tree Game, Revisited. arXiv preprint arXiv:1207.2317
(2012)
[12] Cardinal, J., Demaine, E., Fiorini, S., Joret, G., Langerman, S., Newman, I., Weimann, O.:
The Stackelberg minimum spanning tree game. Algorithmica 59 (2), 129–144 (2011)
[13] Cenciarelli, P., Gorla, D., Salvo, I.: Graph theoretic investigations on inefficiencies in network
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1603.01983 (2016)
[14] Chen, X., Diao, Z., Hu, X.: Excluding Braesss paradox in nonatomic selfish routing. Proceeding
of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 219–230 (2015)
[15] Cole, R., Dodis, Y., Roughgarden, T.: Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users.
Proceedings of the 35th ACM symposium on Theory of Computing, 521–530 (2003)
[16] Correa, J., Guzma´n, C., Lianeas, T., Nikolova, E., Schro¨der, M.: Network Pricing: How
to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators. Proceedings of the 19th ACM
Conference on Economics and Computation, 375–392 (2018)
[17] Dafermos, S., Sparrow, F.: The traffic assignment problem for a general network. Journal of
Research of the National Bureau of Standards B 73 (2), 91-118 (1969)
[18] Eppstein, D.: Parallel recognition of series-parallel graphs. Information and Computation 98
(1), 41–55 (1992)
[19] Fleischer, L., Jain, K., Mahdian, M.: Tolls for heterogeneous selfish users in multicommodity
networks and generalized congestion games. Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science, 277–285 (2004)
[20] Fujishige, S., Goemans, M., Harks, T., Peis, B., Zenklusen, R.: Matroids are immune to Braess
paradox. Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (3), 745–761 (2017)
[21] Harks, T., Scha¨fer, G., Sieg, M.: Computing flow-inducing network tolls. Technical Report
36-2008, Technische Universita¨t Berlin (2008)
[22] Harks, T., Schro¨der, M., Vermeulen, D.: Toll Caps in Privatized Road Networks. European
Journal of Operational Research 276 (3), 947-956 (2019)
17
[23] Hart, S., Nisan, N.: Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 172, 313–347 (2017)
[24] Hayrapetyan, A., Tardos, E´., Wexler, T.: A network pricing game for selfish traffic. Distributed
Computing 19 (4), 255-266 (2007)
[25] Hearn, D., Ramana, M.: Solving congestion toll pricing models. Equilibrium and advanced
transportation modelling, 109–124 (1998)
[26] Huang, X., Ozdaglar, A., Acemoglu, D.: Efficiency and Braess’ Paradox under pricing in
general networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 24 (5), 977-991 (2006)
[27] Johari, R., Weintraub, G., Van Roy, B.: Investment and market structure in industries with
congestion. Operations Research 58 (5), 1303–1317 (2010)
[28] Joret, G.: Stackelberg network pricing is hard to approximate. Networks 57 (2), 117–120 (2011)
[29] Karakostas, G., Kolliopoulos, S.: Edge pricing of multicommodity networks for heterogeneous
selfish users. Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer
Science, 268–276 (2004)
[30] Labbe´, M., Marcotte, P., Savard, G.: A bilevel model of taxation and its application to optimal
highway pricing. Management Science 44, 1608–1622 (1998)
[31] Li, X., Yao, A.: On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (28), 11232–11237 (2013)
[32] Milchtaich, I.: Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium. Games Economic Behavior
57 (2), 321–346 (2006)
[33] Oxley, J.: Matroid theory (1992)
[34] Ozdaglar, A.: Price competition with elastic traffic. Networks: An International Journal 52
(3),141–155 (2008)
[35] Roch, S., Savard, G., Marcotte, P.: An approximation algorithm for Stackelberg network
pricing. Networks: An International Journal 46 (1), 57-67 (2005)
[36] Roughgarden, T.: On the severity of Braesss Paradox: designing networks for selfish users is
hard. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 72 (5), 922–953 (2006)
[37] Schrijver, A.: Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency (2003)
[38] Van Hoesel, S.: An overview of Stackelberg pricing in networks. European Journal of Opera-
tional Research 189 (3), 1393–1402 (2008)
[39] Von Stackelberg, H.: Marktform und Gleichgewicht (1934)
[40] Yang, H., Huang, H.: The multi-class, multi-criteria traffic network equilibrium and systems
optimum problem. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 38 (1), 1–15 (2004)
18
[41] Wardrop, J.: Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research. Proceedings of the Institute of
Civil Engineers 1 (3), 325–362 (1952)
[42] Welsh, D.: Matroid theory (2010)
19
